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Abstract1
Economic and political decisions usually involve a trade-off between efficiency
and equality considerations. While some inequality is expected to prevail in our soci-
eties, high levels of it are objectionable on various grounds. One of the fundamental
roles of government is to collect and reallocate resources among its citizens, and iden-
tifying the right policies to guide these reallocations is central to promoting higher
equality. While we now have a good grasp of which policies lead to more equality
and which do not, we know much less about why they seem to be adopted to varying
degrees of intensity in some places and times and not in others. To explain this varia-
tion in policy outcomes, the most fundamental task is to identify the constituencies for
the different policies. Who supports what policies and under what conditions do they
support them? In this paper this question is investigated based on public opinion data
on preferences over taxation and government spending on conditional-cash-transfers,
pension schemes, and education. All policies that were found to significantly affect
inequality. We find that disagreement across socio-economic groups arise not so much
on whether the government should tackle inequality, but on how it should go about
doing it. Poorer respondents tend to support cash transfers to a greater extent than the
rich. But the rich tend to be more likely to support expenditures on public provision
education than the poor. Contrary to what is commonly assumed, inequality seems to
breed altruism among the rich when it comes to the quintessential poverty reduction
scheme of conditional-cash-transfers.
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1 Introduction
Economic and political decisions usually involve a trade-off between efficiency and equality con-
siderations. While some inequality is expected to prevail in our societies, high levels of it are ob-
jectionable not only on fairness grounds, but also for their negative effects on other desirable goals
such as political and economic development (Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini
(1994), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000)) and social cohesion (Glaeser et al. (2002), Gylfason and
Zoega (2003)). A central concern for both researchers and practitioners in the development com-
munity has been to identify and propose solutions to high inequality. This is particularly true in
the case of Latin America, whose countries still figure prominently among the most unequal in the
world.
One of the fundamental roles of government is to collect and reallocate resources among
its citizens. There are many different ways in which this can be done, and identifying the right
policies to guide these reallocations is central to promoting higher equality. But also important is
understanding the political feasibility of such policies, that is, their chances of being adopted as a
result of the political process. Given that governments might expropriate the earnings of some to
dole out on others, some of these schemes are bound to face considerable opposition.
Based on a prolific literature, we now have a good grasp of which policies lead to more
equality and which do not. What we know much less about is why they seem to be adopted
to varying degrees of intensity in some places and times and not in others. According to data
compiled by the OECD, for example, public expenditure on social policy has reached an average
of 19% of GDP in 2007 in the developed world. It ranged, however, from 16% of GDP in Australia
and the US to 28% in France. In Mexico and Chile, these numbers were 7% and 11% respectively,
while in Brazil it was about 20%. The composition of these expenditures also vary considerably.
In Europe countries spend on average 7% of GDP in pensions and 6% in health. In Brazil the
government spends about 4% of GDP in health and 10% in pensions.
The natural initial step in understanding this variation in policy choices and extent of im-
plementation is to ask ourselves how much support these policies garner among citizens. Who
supports what policies and under what circumstances do they support them? Whether politicians
are motivated by their own convictions, votes or campaign contributions, they rely on pleasing
some constituency. The primary input to the political process is thus individuals’ preferences. And
identifying these constituencies and how strongly they feel about different policies is the most
fundamental task in explaining policy outcomes.
The main determinant of preferences for redistributive policies has long been thought to
be income. More precisely, it has been believed to depend on relative income, most commonly
captured by inequality levels. Higher inequality usually means a higher proportion of poorer people
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– those earning less than the average income – in society. Given that they tend to benefit from
public services and transfers to a greater extent than the richer – who in addition tend to foot a
bigger share of the bill through taxes –, higher inequality is expected to be associated with higher
demand for such services and transfers by the poorer majority. This argument has been formalized
among others by Meltzer and Richard (1981) under the assumptions that citizens are subject to
uniform taxes and equal lumpsum transfers by the government. The result is that those earning
less than the mean income end up paying less in taxes than they earn back in transfers. Given
that in unequal societies a majority earns less than the mean income, such transfers would garner
enough support to be implemented by politicians seeking to win elections.
More generally, the expectation that the worse off would press the elites for redistribution
proportionally to their relative position in society is not new. While many scholars attribute the
extension of the franchise to the elite trying to contain a revolution caused by an increase in these
redistributive pressures (Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)), oth-
ers claim that once afforded political rights, the poor would continue to make such demands, in
particular if inequality were to increase (Romer (1975), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and
Tabellini (1994)).
While these dynamics and expectations have been around for quite some time, empirical
analyses that are consistent with them have been scarce. To begin with, to many empirical re-
searchers this was not just a claim about how inequality affects demand for redistributive policies,
but a claim about the relationship between inequality and actual levels of redistribution. Empir-
ical evaluations of this relationship are usually explored at the country level using “government
redistributive efforts” (usually measured as the share of social spending over GDP) as a dependent
variable and common measures of inequality, like the GINI coefficient, as the main explanatory
factor. Most of these studies, however, have been unable to find a positive relationship between the
two (Be´nabou (1996), Be´nabou (2000), Milanovic (2000), Moene and Wallerstein (2001), Kauf-
man and Segura-Ubiergo (2001)). Even in some rare cases where the dependent variable was
support for the government promoting equality, based on public opinion data, inequality was not
found to matter (Haggard et al. (2010)) at the country level.
Many factors may account for these results. First, redistributive policies come in different
shapes and sizes and we know little about who supports each type and to what extent they do.
There is no agreed upon conceptualization of the term as a homogeneous bundle of policies per-
mitting clear comparisons across countries and studies. In fact, the same transfer scheme or service
provision may have a different impact on inequality in different countries and different periods of
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time2.Most studies rely on the assumption that the low income majority would invariably support
more of everything, but that is not necessarily the case.
Second, even if we assume this demand is high, the political process culminating in the
actual adoption of policies is long and complex. Leaping from preferences straight to final out-
comes, may be too simplistic an assumption to make. In cross-sections it is practically impossible
to control for all institutional and structural factors that might explain differences in the extent to
which governments redistribute.
Third, inequality measures are notoriously heterogeneous. This is not only in terms of
methodological approach, but also in terms of the baseline information and time periods used to
compute them across countries. This severely compromises comparability, specially if we include
developing countries in the analysis.
In this paper we evaluate the link between income, inequality and demand for redistributive
policies empirically in a way that addresses those concerns. First, the focus is on support for
different redistributive policies and not on how much governments spend on social policy overall.
The specific policies studied were chosen based on who are found to be the net payers and the
net beneficiaries in each case, and on the estimated effects of each policy on inequality. Based
on the findings of de Barros et al. (2002), Velez et al. (2003), de Barros et al. (2006), Lindert
et al. (2006) four policies are considered: conditional-cash-transfer, provision of public education,
non-contributory pensions, and pensions to public employees. The first three were found to be
highly redistributive from rich to poor, while the last highly regressive. They were also found to
significantly affect levels of inequality. In addition to these four policies, the analysis also includes
a common item on public opinion surveys about support for the government fighting inequality –
without specifying a particular policy – and an item on support for progressive taxation. Overall,
patterns of support for these different policies should provide a good understanding of citizen’s
predispositions towards redistribution and government efforts to promote higher equality.
Second, the analysis is based on data from just one country, Brazil. This set up brings
institutional variation to a minimum and allows the use of measures of inequality that are compa-
rable across units of analysis – in this case Brazilian municipalities. Brazil is an interesting case
study as it has been making progress in promoting more equality, but its level of inequality remains
comparatively very high.
To preview the main results, disagreement across socio-economic groups arise not so much
on whether the government should tackle inequality, but on how it should do it. This is true
both in terms of how to collect funds and how to go about spending it. Regarding patterns of
support, poorer respondents display a lot more variation across different policies than their richer
2 The canonical example being unemployment insurance, which tends to be regressive in developing democracies and
progressive in more developed ones.
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counterparts, whose willingness to pay higher taxes to finance these policies is usually low. As
expected in models of lump sum transfers, the poor display higher levels of support for cash-
transfer schemes (be them pensions to the old or conditional cash transfers to all ages) than richer
respondents. However, the reverse is true in the case of public provision of education. In that case,
richer respondents display higher levels of support, even if they are not the primary beneficiaries
of this policy. Inequality, in turn, seems to matter when the policy in question is conditional-
cash-transfer or how progressive the tax system should be. Contrary to expectations, however, as
inequality rises so does the support of the rich for conditional-cash-transfer. Thus inequality seems
to breed altruism when it comes to the quintessential poverty reduction scheme of helping the poor
conditional on certain behavioral requirements.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief overview of the lit-
erature on the determinants of preferences for redistribution. While income and inequality have
received disproportionate attention, there is a host of previously identified determinants that we
need to take into account. The third section describes the data and methodology used in the analy-
sis and the final section provides a brief discussion of the results.
2 The Determinants of Preferences for Redistribution
As highlighted in the previous section, the objective of this analysis is to understand the main
patterns of support for different types of redistributive policies. These preferences are the main
input to the political game culminating in the actual adoption of policies, specially in democratic
countries. The literature on preferences for redistributive policies is rich. Usually each contribu-
tion has focused on a particular set of factors and comparability across studies is further hindered
by lack of a common conceptualization of redistribution. In order to bring this scattered literature
together, we deal with each one of these issues in turn. This should help set the stage to evaluate
these contributions under a common approach in the empirical section.
2.1 Which Policies Redistribute?
Redistributive policies are not all made equal. Some target specific groups – e.g. the unemployed,
the elderly, school aged children – while others are more inclusive – e.g. public health provision.
Some government provided benefits are delivered in kind – e.g. education, health – , while others
in cash – e.g. old age pensions, conditional-cash-transfers. Given these differences we should not
expect the same underlying dynamics of support to be at work in each case (Machado (2010)).
While demand for cash transfers might always be high among those in need, this is not necessarily
the case when the benefit is delivered in kind and requires investment on the part of the recipients.
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One example is education, where the opportunity cost of sending children to school, even if free,
might be too high for some poor families to afford.
This means the choice of dependent variable should play a major role in estimating the
effects of individual and contextual factors on citizens’ predispositions towards fighting inequality.
A recent study commissioned by the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA)
on the causes of the observed reduction in inequality in Brazil estimates that around 15% of that
decline is due to a decrease in educational inequality and how the labor market responded to it.
More important than education, the study estimates that 35% of the decrease in inequality can be
attributed to the social protection system, encompassing both the Bolsa Famı´lia program and the
Benefı´cio de Prestac¸a˜o Continuada (BPC), which is a non-contributory pension scheme to the old
and handicapped poor.
These results are in line with a study on social policy in Latin America conducted by the
World Bank in 2003. Considering a broader range of policies, this study has found their individual
effects on inequality to vary considerably. Figure 1 displays the percentage of government spend-
ing on selected public-funded programs accruing to the lowest and the highest income quintiles.
Three striking patterns emerge from this figure. The first is that classical welfare policies such
as pensions, unemployment benefits and adult skills training are actually regressive. Currently in
Brazil more than half of the total economically active population is working in the informal sector.
This automatically excludes this group from contribution based benefits such as employment insur-
ance and pension schemes. As revealed in a study by the IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e
Estatı´stica), the informal sector tends to employ in higher proportion those with lower educational
attainment. If we take into account that half of total social expenditures goes towards pensions,
then we have a situation where the poor, in particular the urban poor, is excluded from most of
these money.
In Brazil there are two non contribution based pension like transfers that benefit the poor.
One is the Rural Pension (Prevideˆncia rural) created in 1992 reaching those who live from subsis-
tence farming (no employees) and have worked as such for the same amount of years required of
regular employees in the formal sector (30 to 35 years). The benefit corresponds to one minimum
wage. The second is the BPC implemented in 1996 which pays one minimum wage to the elderly
and handicapped whose monthly family per capita income falls below one fourth of the minimum
wage. Contrary to the rural pension, the BPC is not part of the pension system and is much less
encompassing than the regular contribution based benefit which also covers sickness, death, among
others.
The second pattern emerging from Figure 1 refers to policies in the area of education. On
the one hand primary education and related services – kindergarten, school meals and day care
– are progressive. However, secondary education, adult skills training and tertiary education are
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Figure 1. Percent of government spending accruing to the lowest and highest income quintiles
on selected publicly-funded programs.
Source: Velez et al. (2003)
all regressive. This picture reflects an important problem in the redistributive system, where the
policies that are most likely to help lift people out of poverty are the privilege of a few. Notice,
that public services like education are non-excludable. This means that there are barriers other
than blatant exclusion preventing the worse-off from taking advantage of available secondary and
tertiary education. Without good primary and secondary schooling public universities are rarely
an option to those born in poorer households. Public universities are highly sought after making
acceptance difficult to the less educated (entrance is determined based on standardized test scores).
In the case of secondary education the problem is likely related to the expected returns being low
relative to the investment required mainly in terms of time and wages forgone.
If we consider the proportion of total social expenditures that is in fact allocated towards
each of these groups of policies, a revealing picture emerges. Brazil spends about 20% of its GDP
on social policies. Practically half of it goes towards pensions, around 4% towards education and
another 4% towards health. Overall, more is spent on contribution based benefits, even though the
country’s tax system is found to be regressive. Furthermore when the subject is human capital, the
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distortions in the system are felt both in education, where public universities are prioritized, and
health, where more expensive procedures are dispensed mostly to the rich (Arretche (2003)).
In sum, the mapping of the left (pro-poor)/right scale onto specific policies in new democ-
racies is rather different than what we usually take for granted in the field. As the academic and
research debate in general has evolved over the years on the issue of poverty and inequality, so
have the policies deemed most effective to combat these ills. The multifaceted problem posed by
these issues to new democracies today is indeed complex and clearly different from what it was
at the time western welfare states emerged. This heterogeneity of effects of policies on inequality,
even if we limit ourselves to the so called “redistributive” ones, raises three important issues when
we are concerned with patterns of demand for them.
First, since some important forms of redistribution can be regressive, it is not quite clear that
the poor would invariably demand high levels of it. Second, given that transfers are targeted, the
poor may not exactly agree on one single form that would benefit them all as a group. According
to the World Bank study (Velez et al. (2003)) on inequality in Brazil, for example, the poverty
rate among the old is reduced after pension transfers, while that of the younger cohort is made
worse. Thus the poor may not vote together, even if the only salient issue is redistribution. Third,
the dynamics determining demand for different types of redistribution may differ according to the
nature of the transfer.
In order to explore this potential heterogeneity, the empirical analysis is conducted on sev-
eral questions related to redistribution. Five of them were designed to gauge support for specific
social spending policies – primary education, secondary education, conditional-cash-transfer, non-
contributory pensions, and public sector pensions. One item was intented to capture preferences
for redistribution through taxation (as opposed to spending), measured as the extent of progres-
siveness of income taxes. Finally, for comparative purposes, the analysis is also conducted on a
common survey item about how proactive the government should be in fighting inequality, without
mention to a specific policy.
2.2 Who supports redistribution?
The primary factor determining preferences for social spending is arguably the likelihood of being
a beneficiary of such policies. In most cases this is determined on the basis of income. Poor people
are more likely to be eligible for cash-transfers, to enroll their children in public schools, and to rely
on public provision of health services. However, as argued in Machado (2010), given that the poor
in most cases pay an important amount of taxes (Lindert et al., 2006), social spending on services
providing long term benefits (such as education), might not be a priority to poor households. Thus
income might not always be positively associated with higher demand for services that are found
to be redistributive and to have an important effect on reducing inequality.
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Moreover, at the individual level, the literature has identified three main factors likely to
influence support for redistributive policies. The first two are ethnicity and religion 3. The effect of
race on preferences for redistribution has been studied more at length based on the US context (see
Alesina and Glaeser (2004)). A prominent argument is that certain races may favor higher levels
of redistribution if they are overly represented among the poor group. The alignment of class and
race would prompt altruism towards ones race group that would reflect on higher levels of support
for transfers targeted to that group independent of the individual being a direct beneficiary. That
would be the case for blacks in the US, and, arguably, for blacks in Brazil as well. We would thus
expect black or pardo4 respondents to display higher levels of support for redistributive policies
favoring the lower segments of society.
When it comes to religion there are two lines of argument. The first emphasizes the effect
of particular religious thoughts on individuals’ take on fairness and tolerance for inequality. Thus
protestants, to whom individual effort is of great importance, would favor less redistribution than
their catholic counterparts, usually associated with more conservative values. A second line of ar-
gument emphasizes the extra support afforded to members of religious groups, both psychological
and material (Scheve and Stasavage (2008)). That is, when facing economic hardships, members
of a religious community can count on both support groups and, in some cases, financial aid. This
makes them less dependent on government provision of social protection and thus less support-
ive of it. According to this view, it is not so much the religion that matters, but membership or
attendance in a religious group. Thus higher levels of participation in religious groups’ activities
should be associated with lower propensity to support redistribution.
Another common factor associated with preferences for redistribution is social mobility
(Alesina and La Ferrara (2001), Kristov et al. (1992), Piketty (1995), Roemer (1998)). According
to this approach the prospect of upward mobility can depress demand for redistribution. The
reasoning is that since policies are sticky, individuals who expect not to benefit from them in
the long run might not support them today, even if in the present they could be advantageous.
Therefore, the more individuals see themselves as moving up the economic ladder, the lower we
would expect their levels of support for redistribution to be.
As argued by many scholars, however, not only personal factors matter for how much
redistribution an individual is willing to support. Characteristics of the environment are crucial in
3 For some authors, both religion and ethnic fractionalization opens up the opportunity for the elite to make issues
related to these cleavages more salient to keep taxes and redistribution at check (Amat and Wibbels (2009)). That is,
while the poor might favor redistribution they are led to vote on other issues related to their ethnicity or religion that
are purposefully made more politically relevant. Given the within-country approach, however, and the fact that most
redistributive policies in Brazil are decided at the federal level, we have no variation in that respect. Instead, we focus
on the specific effects these factors are believed to have on preferences for redistributive policies.
4 Pardo is a category used by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) that lies between black and
white.
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determining the losers and winners of redistributive schemes. This is particularly true for levels of
poverty and inequality, as they determine the relative position of individuals in the income scale.
Poverty levels affect the size of the pie to be redistributed and is usually associated with a higher
number of eligible beneficiaries. As a result higher taxes would need to be collected to cover a
given benefit. Therefore, under the assumption of a fixed benefit amount and no changes in the tax
structure, we would expect individual willingness to support redistributive schemes to be lower in
poorer areas..
Inequality, in turn, determines the relative position of individuals in the income scale. Fol-
lowing the logic of political economy models of redistribution, higher inequality means a median
voter further away from the mean and thus more supportive of redistribution. Moreover, higher
inequality means greater discrepancies between the incomes of the rich and that of the poor, and
therefore a larger tax burden on top earners. If individuals have reason to value their own wealth
to a greater extent than the potential social gains from redistributive policies, we would expect the
rich to favor less redistribution as inequality increases. Conversely, given that the median is rela-
tively poorer in less equal societies, we would expect her to favor more redistribution as inequality
increases.
A final contextual variable included in the analysis is the level of urbanization of an individ-
ual’s community (Haggard et al. (2010)). It is argued that in bigger urban areas, collective action
problems are lower, public provision of services and benefits tends to be higher and so tend to be
citizens’ expectations of what the government is actually capable of providing. This means that
smaller town dwellers would be more skeptical about the government providing social protection
to them and thus less supportive of it.
An important issue that deserves attention is whether local levels of the contextual factors
or national levels should matter for individual support. While these policies are mostly set by the
federal government, it is known that individuals tend to extrapolate to the national level what they
experience locally. Given the within country approach used, we have the opportunity to investigate
this issue empirically.
3 Data and Methods
The data used come from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) collected in the
beginning of 2010 in Brazil. The sample of 2485 respondents was drawn randomly to be repre-
sentative of the country and its five regions. Out of the 27 states in Brazil, 17 are in the sample
encompassing 54 municipalities. Each municipality contains about 30 observations, which allows
us to estimate the effect of municipal level variables on individual responses using multilevel es-
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timation techniques. This is fortuitous, given the focus on estimating the relationship between
individual and community level characteristics on people’s preferences for redistribution.
3.1 Different Measures of Redistributive Effort
As explained in the previous section, it is difficult to capture preferences for redistribution with
one single question. The analysis is thus carried out on seven different measures of support for
governments’ redistributive efforts. First, and for the purposes of comparison with studies surveyed
in the previous section, we use an item asking respondents to indicate their level of agreement with
a statement that says “The Brazilian state should implement firm policies to reduce the income
inequality between rich and poor.” (Figure 2a).
Figure 2. Responses to Redistributive Effort and Taxation.
(a) Government Should Implement Policies 
 to Reduce Inequality
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This is followed by the analysis of six specific policy questions, covering individuals’ pref-
erences over expenditures on public provision of primary and secondary education, non-contributory
pensions to the old poor, conditional-cash transfer (Bolsa Famı´lia), the generous pension scheme
to public employees (see Figure 3) and the incidence of taxation across income groups (Figure
2b). The questions on spending (except for conditional-cash-transfers) were asked making it ex-
plicit to respondents the trade-off between expenditures and tax levels. For each policy they were
asked whether they preferred increasing tax and expenditures, keeping taxes and expenditures as
is, reducing taxes and expenditures or reducing taxes and terminating the intervention. The item
on taxes, prompted respondents to choose a preferred level of progressivity in income taxes. These
levels ranged from equal across income groups to highly progressive (rich paying six times more
taxes than the poor).
Figure 3. Responses to Social Policies.
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Source: LAPOP Brazil 2010
As shown in Figure 2a, there is almost complete agreement that the government should be
proactive in fighting inequality. Figures 2b and 3, however, indicate that individuals may hold very
distinctive views about what specific policies should be implemented to achieve it. If we look at
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the percentage of individuals in each income group who supports increasing each of these policies
– and supports very progressive taxation – (Figure 4), we notice some disagreement.
Figure 4. Support for Policies by Income Group.
poor low middle
middle rich
CCT
Primary Education
Secondary Education
BPC
Pension
Tax
Note: Each section of the income group plots represents the percentage of in-
dividuals belonging to that income group that agrees with paying higher taxes to
increase the provision of the corresponding service. The section corresponding
to Tax, represents the percentage of individuals supporting highly progressive
taxation (for every Real earned, a rich person should pay .60 and a poor person
should pay .10).
Another way to look at the issue is to inspect the correlation between answers to the policy
items. Do respondents tend to agree with the same bundle of policies? Based on the correlation
matrix displayed in Figure 5 the answer is most likely not. Preferences over the incidence of
taxation tend to be uncorrelated with the different ways in which the government might spend what
is collected. Even among different classes of spending, support for the Bolsa Famı´lia Program is
practically orthogonal to support for pensions and public provision of education.
Moreover, answers to the item commonly employed in studies of preferences for redis-
tribution (whether the government should be proactive about it) is not correlated with any of the
answers to the items about specific policies. It is not even related to the now quintessential redis-
tributive policy of conditional-cash-transfers. These results suggest that the dynamics of support
for each of these policies are conceivably different. They illustrate how difficult it is to talk about
preferences for redistribution in general, thus warranting the analysis performed in the next section
on each of these items separately.
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Figure 5. Correlation Matrix for Policy Items
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3.2 The Explanatory Variables
We explore the effects of both individual and community level factors on support for redistributive
policies. Three municipal characteristics are considered: inequality, poverty, and size. The mea-
sures of inequality were compiled based on the 2000 census. All the models were run using the
Theil index and the GINI index – calculated by individual using the household per capita income5.
The results hold for both measures with a slightly better fit using the GINI. For the sake of space
We just report the results obtained using the GINI.
A second important factor at the municipal level is the extent of poverty. Different measures
are available to gauge that: income per capita, percentage of inhabitants below the poverty line,
and a more general measure based on the United Nation’s Human Development Index methodol-
ogy. They are all highly correlated (at about .95) with each other. All the models were estimated
alternating between them with no significant differences. Results are reported for the percentage
of poor. Figure 6 displays the incidence of poverty and inequality across Brazilian municipali-
ties comparing the distribution of the full universe of municipalities with that of municipalities
included the LAPOP sample.
5 We also tried using different ratios of municipal income, but given the small size of some of the municipalities, these
measures were prone to extreme outliers, so they were not included in the analysis.
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Figure 6. Poverty and Inequality Across Municipalities
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A host of individual characteristics is also included in the analysis following the discussion
in the previous section. An important factor bearing on preferences for redistribution is an individ-
ual’s socio-economic status. In the developing world this is usually captured by a combination of
a person’s educational achievement and income, as they tend to be highly correlated. On income,
individuals were asked to place the earnings of their household in one of eleven brackets. Given the
levels of inequality in Brazil, we take the average of the log of the minimum and maximum income
of the range to be the mean household income. Based on information about the number of members
of the household, we then compute the average mean household income per capita. Since some of
the households benefit from social protection and that we have information on who receives cash
transfers from the Bolsa Famı´lia program, before running these calculations we subtract from the
maximum income of each household the estimated amount of the benefit using information on the
number of children in the household (the actual benefit varies according to this information).
Four income categories are included in the analysis. The first comprises all of those eligible
for the Bolsa Famı´lia benefit, that is, those with income per capita below one fourth of the minimum
15
Figure 7. Beneficiaries of Bolsa Famlia by Income Group.
co
u
n
t
0
200
400
600
800
1000
poor low middle middle rich
Benefit from 
 Bolsa Familia
no
yes
Source: LAPOP 2010 data and author’s calculations
wage. The second category comprises those that we denote as the low middle class. Their income
is too high to benefit from social protection, but still low enough that they cannot be considered
middle class6. This is an interesting class to study in the context of redistribution. This group
includes the median voter, on which many theories place considerable emphasis. And individuals
in this group are excluded from social protection, but can still be considered poor incomewise. The
next class is the middle class, calculated based on a 10 dollars minimum per capita income up to
the 95th percentile of the income distribution (see Birdsall (2010)). Figure 7 shows the incidence
of beneficiaries of the Bolsa Famı´lia Program in each of the income groups.
Educational attainment, in turn, is measured as a factor of three levels: primary education
or less (48%), secondary education (42%), and college or higher (10%). The remaining controls
include race, religion, church attendance, social mobility, city size, and age. These variables are
coded as follows:
Race The LAPOP survey provides six categories of race: black (9%), white (35%), indigenous
(2%), asian descent (3%), other (1%), and pardo (50%) – this last category corresponds to
those who see themselves between the black and the white category.
6 Here we employ the common definition of middle class as usually having some college education and with an income
that afford members of the household a reasonable level of security. Nancy Birdsall (2010) and other authors have
proposed a threshold of 10 dollars a day to meet this requirement.
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Religion We work with five main religions: catholic (61%), protestant (13%), evangelical (15%),
no religion (7%), and other – Jeova witness, candomble´, umbanda, etc – (4%).
Church This measure captures frequency of church attendance from low (never to almost never)
to high (more than once a week).
Mobility This is captured by a three level factor measure of individuals’ expectations of future
mobility. It can be negative – individual believes own economic situation will deteriorate in
the next twelve months – (5%), the same – individual expects no change – (25%), or positive
– individual believes situation will improve – (70%).
City Size Municipalities in the sample are categorized according to their size into four groups:
small (27%), medium (12%), large (22%), and capitals (39%).
Age A continuous variable measured in years.
3.3 Methodology
The combination of municipal and individual level covariates calls for a multilevel approach to data
analysis. Not only we expect factors at these different levels to matter, we also expect individual
factors to matter differently depending on the municipal level characteristics. More specifically,
we expect an individual’s socio-economic status to be associated with varying levels of support
for policies depending on this individual’s relative position in his surroundings. This position is
mainly determined by the levels of inequality in the municipality.
In order to explore the possible hierarchical structure of the data, the models are specified
with flexibility, allowing for both random intercepts and random slopes. In each model the esti-
mated effect of individual income and education is allowed to vary by municipality. We can then
estimate the variance of these slopes to gauge their degree of heterogeneity across cities.
Given the different scales in which the dependent variables are coded, different assump-
tions about the distribution of the errors are made in each case. In particular, the first dependent
variable analysed – whether the respondent agrees that the state should implement policies to fight
inequality – a normal distribution is assumed. Formally, the model is given by:
yj[i] = αj + incomej[i]βj + educationj[i]γj +Xj[i]ψ1 + Ujψ2 +GINIj ∗ incomej[i]ψ3
αj ∼ N(µα, σ2α)
βj ∼ N(µβ, σ2β)
γj ∼ N(µγ, σ2γ),
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for i = 1, ..., nj and j = 1, ..., 54, where i indexes individuals, j[i] means individual i belongs to
municipality j, nj is the number of individuals in municipality j, yj[i] is the level of agreement of
individual i with the statement, X is a matrix containing individual level covariates except income
and education and U is a vector of municipal level covariates.
The remaining categorical variables are analysed in dichotomous form7. As shown in Fig-
ure 3 very few respondents display a preference for reducing or eliminating any of the policies
listed in the survey. The interesting variation lies between those favoring an increase in the pro-
vision of the policies – even if they need to pay higher taxes for it – and those favoring the status
quo. Thus those favoring higher levels of provision are coded as 1 while those preferring to either
maintain the status quo or reduce provision are coded as zero8. Regarding taxes, two different
categorizations were analysed. First, grouping all those favoring progressive taxation versus those
favoring equal rates. Second, singling out the group favoring the most progressive alternative.
These models were specified as follows:
Pr(yj[i] = 1) = logit
−1(αj + incj[i]βj + educj[i]γj +Xj[i]ψ1 + Ujψ2 +GINIj ∗ incomej[i]ψ3)
αj ∼ N(µα, σ2α)
βj ∼ N(µβ, σ2β)
γj ∼ N(µγ, σ2γ),
for i = 1, ..., nj and j = 1, ..., 54, where i indexes individuals, j[i] means individual i
belongs to municipality j, nj is the number of individuals in municipality j, yj[i] = 1 means
individual i prefers to increase expenditure on policy, X is a matrix containing individual level
covariates except income and education and U is a vector of municipal level covariates.
4 Results
The various items analyzed seem to respond differently to the individual and municipal factors
investigated. We find mixed evidence in favor of the expectations described in the previous section.
For a general overview of the main results, Figure 8 displays the estimated coefficients of the
control variables (with the 90% confidence intervals) while results on the main coefficients are
plotted in Figure 99. Overall, respondents falling under the category of poor do not always display
7 Multilevel models have a complex structure raising issues of convergence and interpretation. Both are severely
complicated in the case of an ordered probit or ordered logit specification.
8 Preliminary analysis of an alternative dichotomization – coding as 1 those favoring a reduction in provision and as
zero those favoring the status quo or an increase – display a poorer fit of the model. Most likely this is due to the very
small variation in answers, with only very few respondents choosing to reduce provision.
9 The codes for Figures 3, 9 and 8 were taken from www.tables2graphs.com.
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the highest levels of support. They tend to report significantly more support for conditional-cash-
transfers and non-contributory pensions, but lower levels for public provision of education, in
particular secondary schooling.
On race, there is evidence that blacks and pardos are significantly more likely to agree with
an expansion of the Bolsa Famı´lia Program than whites. This difference is not significant, however,
in any other case. When it comes to religion, there is no evidence of more participation leading
to lower support. In fact, there is no evidence of religious engagement affecting preferences at
all. Differences in religious thoughts are significant in the expected direction when the issue is
whether the government should implement policies to reduce income inequality. Protestants are
significantly less likely to agree with it than catholics (the baseline category in the estimation).
When looking at specific policies, however, religion has no significant effect.
Perceptions of social mobility seem to matter in most cases, but in the opposite direction
claimed in the literature. Prospects of upward mobility is significantly associated with higher
support for increasing provision of public education, both primary and secondary, non-contributory
pensions to the old poor, and for the government implementing policies to reduce inequality.
At the municipal level both the extent of poverty and the size of the city matter for support
for progressive taxation. In bigger and poorer cities, popular support for heavily taxing the rich is
significantly higher. Results on inequality and its interaction with personal income are discussed
case by case below. Given the non-linearity of the models (by assumption about the errors or
inclusion of interaction effects), it is difficult to gauge actual levels of significance of the estimated
effects, as they depend on values taken by other variables. To help extricate these estimated effects,
results will be discussed based on predicted values and probabilities looking at each dependent
variable at a time.
4.1 State should implement firm policies against inequality
As shown in Figure 2 most respondents to the LAPOP survey tended to strongly agree with the
statement that said the state should implement policies to reduce inequality. One possible rea-
son, and an issue to keep in mind, is social desirability bias. No particular policy is mentioned
in the wording, just the goal of fighting inequality, a condition usually portrayed as morally re-
proachable. As shown in the previous section, answers to this item are not correlated with support
for any particular policy, including two of the most redistributive ones, progressive taxation and
conditional-cash-transfers. Possibly due to the low variation in answers, the model fit is not as
good as it is for the other dependent variables. Letting the slopes on income and education vary
by municipality leads to non-convergence. Thus results are reported based on a random intercepts
model.
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Figure 8. Regression Results for Control Variables.
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Note: Dots represent coefficient estimates and lines the 90% confidence interval. All models are logit
models with the exception of “State Fight Inequality” which was estimated based on a linear regression.
Not all variables in the model are represented in this figure. All models also include the income,
educational level, and race of the respondent, as well as the level of inequality in the municipality and
its interactions with income displayed in the next figure.
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Figure 9. Regression Results for Main Variables.
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Note: Dots represent coefficient estimates and lines the 90% confidence interval. All models are
logit models with the exception of “State Fight Inequality” which was estimated based on a linear
regression. Not all variables in the model are represented in this figure. All models also include the
controls displayed in Figure 8.
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Figure 10. Government Should Adopt Policies Against Inequality.
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Note: Dots, jittered for graphical clarity, represent actual answers. Lines repre-
sent fitted model for each profile of respondents and letting municipal inequality
levels vary. For the poor profile education was set to primary or less, for the low
middle it was set to secondary and the rich were coded as having college educa-
tion. All other variables were set to their medians. Church attendance was set to
2, religion to catholic, mobility to 2, age to 36 years old and, city size to big city,
and percentage of poor to 27%.
Figure 10 displays the fitted regression line for three profiles of respondents letting the
inequality levels vary. While the plot suggests a trend in the expected direction, with richer re-
spondents showing lower levels of support the higher the inequality, it fails to attain conventional
levels of statistical significance. The only significant difference in these predicted values is that
between the low middle category (which includes the median voter) and the rich for low levels of
inequality. In more equal municipalities the rich reports higher levels of support for the government
fighting inequality than the median does.
This somewhat contradicts the expectation that income should be positively related to pref-
erences for redistribution. But, again, respondents most likely had different specific policies in
mind when answering this question. As we will see below, the rich is less likely to agree with
policies such as conditional-cash-transfer and progressive taxation than the poor. According to a
study by Reis and Moore (2005) on the elite perceptions of poverty and inequality, this group tends
to associate poverty with the rural population and believe that land reform is the most important
policy for tackling the issue.
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4.2 Conditional-cash-transfers
The Bolsa Famı´lia Program is a conditional cash transfer scheme born out of a local initiative by
the governor of the Federal District called Bolsa Escola in the 1990s. The program was first imple-
mented nationally, although only in very poor municipalities, under the government of Fernando
Henrique Cardoso in 2001. It then witnessed great expansion under president Lula and it now
accounts for about .3% of the GDP (very low compared to the other policies analysed). The model
estimating preferences for increasing the scope of Bolsa Famı´lia, as opposed to leaving it as is
or decreasing it, shows important variation in the estimated coefficients of income and education
across municipalities.
Figure 11. Agree with Increasing Bolsa Famlia Program.
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Note: Dots, jittered for graphical clarity, represent actual answers. Lines repre-
sent fitted model for each profile of respondents and letting municipal inequality
levels vary. For the poor profile education was set to primary or less, for the low
middle it was set to secondary and the rich were coded as having college educa-
tion. All other variables were set to their medians. Church attendance was set to
2, religion to catholic, mobility to 2, age to 36 years old and, city size to big city,
and percentage of poor to 27%.
Figure 11 displays the predicted probabilities for four profiles of respondents letting munic-
ipal inequality levels vary. Contrary to the results obtained with other policy variables, we observe
considerable variation in answers across groups of respondents. In this case, as expected, there is
a strong correlation between income and support for increasing the Bolsa Famı´lia Program, up to
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relatively high levels of inequality (GINI around 0.63). The poor report significantly higher levels
of support, followed by the low middle class and finally the rich.
Given the consistently high levels of support by the poor, inequality matters significantly
only for the rich and the low middle class. According to expectations, inequality is associated with
increasing support by the income group containing the median voter. This could be either a sign of
altruism, as most of them are not eligible for the program, or an indication that models of political
economy are right and having an income below the mean makes one more willing to support redis-
tribution. Contrary to expectations, however, inequality is positively and significantly associated
with higher support for the Bolsa Famı´lia Program by the rich. On the one hand, inequality might
prompt some form of altruism in a time where it is widely viewed as morally objectionable. On
the other, in more unequal municipalities, the economic stimulus generated by the program might
be more readily perceived and appreciated by all.
In addition to income and inequality, race plays a significant role in preferences for the
program. Respondents who identified themselves as pardo, the race category between black and
white, are significantly more likely than whites and blacks to support an increase in the scope of
the program. As shown in Figure 11 their probability of agreeing with that increase is estimated
to be close to 100% if they are also poor. All else equal, respondents reporting being black have
an estimated probability around 60%, while rich white respondents’ estimates range from around
10% to 60%.
4.3 Public Education
Public provision of education is considered an important means to promote more equality as it
levels opportunities and contributes to increases in the educational attainment of the population.
While government spending in primary education has been found to benefit the lowest quintile of
the population to a relatively higher degree than the wealthiest, secondary education, marked by
high drop off rates, achieves the opposite. Despite this disparity, results displayed in Figures 12
and 13 suggest preferences for increasing spending in these two levels of schooling is very similar
across respondents.
Compared to support for increasing the scope of the conditional-cash-transfer program,
support for spending on education is much lower. It starts at around 20% in more equal munic-
ipalities, reaching up to 60% in more unequal ones. This estimated association between higher
inequality and higher support, however, is only statistically significant in the case of secondary
education and for poor respondents. One plausible interpretation is that the returns from education
in more unequal localities is higher, as inequality is found to be associated with skill premiums in
the labor market. Expectations of a positive relationship between inequality and the support of the
median voter and a negative one in the case of support by the rich is not born out by these data.
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Figure 12. Agree with Increasing Provision of Primary Public Education.
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Note: Dots, jittered for graphical clarity, represent actual answers. Lines repre-
sent fitted model for each profile of respondents and letting municipal inequality
levels vary. For the poor profile education was set to primary or less, for the low
middle it was set to secondary and the rich were coded as having college educa-
tion. All other variables were set to their medians. Church attendance was set to
2, religion to catholic, mobility to 2, age to 36 years old, city size to big city, and
percentage of poor to 27%.
Also contrary to what is commonly assumed in the literature, income is positively associ-
ated with agreeing with more expenditures on education. This is true both in the case of primary
and secondary education. While the predicted probabilities of the rich is estimated with high levels
of uncertainty, those of the poor and the median differ significantly. In municipalities with inequal-
ity levels below a GINI of 0.60, the median respondent is significantly more likely to agree with
more taxes and higher spending on both levels of education than the poor.
4.4 Non-contributory pension scheme
The Benefı´cio de Prestac¸a˜o Continuada (BPC) is an important non-contributory pension scheme
targeted to the old and handicapped poor (those living on less than one fourth of the minimum
wage in per capita terms). The amount of the transfer is substantial, at one minimum wage, and
much higher than that of the conditional-cash-transfer. For this reason, this benefit has been found
to affect inequality levels to a great extent and be highly redistributive, but to the older population.
These features of this transfer are somewhat reflected in the results obtained from the analysis. In
particular the fact that it targets a very specific subgroup of the poor.
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Figure 13. Agree with Increasing Provision of Secondary Public Education.
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Note: Dots, jittered for graphical clarity, represent actual answers. Lines repre-
sent fitted model for each profile of respondents and letting municipal inequality
levels vary. For the poor profile education was set to primary or less, for the low
middle it was set to secondary and the rich were coded as having college educa-
tion. All other variables were set to their medians. Church attendance was set to
2, religion to catholic, mobility to 2, age to 36 years old, city size to big city, and
percentage of poor to 27%.
Performing the same exercise as in previous cases, we notice from Figure 14 that older
respondents are significantly more likely to support an expansion of the BPC. This is true across
income and race categories. That is, the old rich is significantly more likely to support the policy
than the young rich, and the old poor is significantly more likely to support it than the young, and
also the median, poor.
As was the case with the Bolsa Famı´lia, income is negatively associated with support for
the BPC. Differences across incomes are statistically significant at middle ranges of inequality.
This is most likely due to lack of power in statistical tests. Predicted probabilities across groups
are very close and there are fewer observations at extreme levels of inequality (the jittered points
at the top and bottom of the graph). Coefficients are thus estimated with higher uncertainty. For
inequality levels ranging from a GINI of .5 up to .65, the old poor respondent is significantly more
likely to support an expansion of the BPC than the rich. In a narrower interval (GINI between .55
and .60) poor black respondents are also significantly more likely than the rich to agree with more
taxes to finance an increase in the provision of the BPC.
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Figure 14. Agree with Increasing Provision of Non-Contributory Pensions.
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Note: Dots, jittered for graphical clarity, represent actual answers. Lines repre-
sent fitted model for each profile of respondents and letting municipal inequality
levels vary. For the poor profile education was set to primary or less, for the low
middle it was set to secondary and the rich were coded as having college educa-
tion. All other variables were set to their medians. Church attendance was set to
2, religion to catholic, mobility to 2, young age to 36 years old, old age to 60, city
size to big city, and percentage of poor to 27%.
Overall, willingness to raise taxes to expand the BPC does not garner the support of a ma-
jority in any group considered. These levels of support are lower than those found for CCT across
all levels of inequality. Among the poor, predicted support range from around 20% to 40%, while
in the case of CCT it ranged from 60% to practically 100% . Compared to the results obtained from
education, support for increasing the BPC is on average similar to those for increasing provision
of education. However, support for the BPC tends to fluctuate less across levels of inequality and
is higher among the poor than the rich.
4.5 Public servant pension scheme
Pension schemes for public servants are one of the main contributors to increasing inequality in
the distribution of income. These are extremely generous schemes that make the already highly
paid public servants remain at the top of the income distribution using tax payers money. Given
the regressivity of the tax system this becomes a highly regressive redistributive policy.
This policy garners the lowest levels of support among all of the ones analysed, includ-
ing non-contributory pension schemes to the old and handicapped poor. As shown in Figure 15,
27
Figure 15. Agree with Increasing Provision of Public Servant Pensions.
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Note: Dots, jittered for graphical clarity, represent actual answers. Lines represent
fitted model for each profile of respondents and letting municipal inequality levels vary.
For the poor profile education was set to primary or less, for the low middle it was set to
secondary and the rich were coded as having college education. All other variables were
set to their medians. Church attendance was set to 2, religion to catholic, mobility to 2,
age to 36 years old, city size to big city, and percentage of poor to 27%.
individuals from different socio-economic backgrounds display similar preferences. The highest
level of agreement with increasing taxes to expand the public pension scheme is among the income
group containing the median voter (low middle). Although the predicted probability of this group
agreeing is low (around 20%) it is significantly higher than that of the poor (black but not pardo)
and the rich for middle levels of inequality.
As suggested by the low variation of predicted probabilities across GINI measures, in-
equality is not significantly associated with levels of support for increasing the scope of the public
pension scheme. Given the extent of regressivity of this transfer, it is surprising that the group con-
taining the median voter, who is relatively poor, displays the highest levels of agreement. Chang-
ing the specification slightly to control for the individual’s occupation does not change the results.
Contrary to what one might expect, respondents who reported being a public servant are not sig-
nificantly more likely to support more taxes to expand this transfer.
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4.6 Progressive Taxation
The particular policies analyzed so far all refer to government spending efforts. An alternative
way of redistributing income is through the collection of revenue to finance these expenditures,
in particular by taxing the rich to a greater extent than the poor. There is, however, much debate
about the merits of using taxation as a means to redistribute income. Distortionary fiscal policy is
associated with externalities that can harm economic growth and as a consequence reduce the size
of the pie available to redistribute. One often cited mechanism is that higher taxes on the rich can
lower investment rates leading to low economic growth.
Politics, however, does not always follow expert assessments. As long as a relevant con-
stituency exists supporting a given policy there is a chance it might be adopted notwithstanding the
opinion of specialists. In a country such as Brazil, where the tax system as a whole is found to be
highly regressive, it would not be surprising to find support for a reversal of the status quo. Overall,
about one third of respondents agree with a uniform tax across income groups. The remaining two
thirds agree with some degree of distortion ranging from the rich paying 30% more taxes to them
paying six times more than the poor.
The analysis was run using different measures as a dependent variable. First, everyone
agreeing with some form of progressive taxation was coded as one and those preferring a uniform
tax system as zero. In this case, predicted levels of agreement were estimated at around 50% for
the poor and low middle respondents and from 30% up to 50% for the rich. These differences,
however, failed to attain statistical significance, including the effect of inequality.
Next, the analysis was run pitching those who reported support for a highly progressive tax
system (the rich paying six times more taxes than the poor) against all others (those supporting a
tax system that ranged from uniform up to the rich paying 2.5 times as much taxes as the poor). In
this case, plotted in Figure 16, some significant differences become apparent. First, in line with the
results obtained with cash transfers, income is negatively correlated with support for progressive
taxation. Over practically the whole range of inequality levels, the poor (whether black or pardo)
were significantly more likely to agree with the item than the rich. Respondents in the low middle
income category (containing the median voter) were also significantly more likely to agree with a
high degree of distortion in taxes than the rich at mid levels of inequality.
Following a similar logic to that of median voter models, inequality is significantly asso-
ciated with the preferences of the low middle income group. The higher the inequality levels the
higher the support of the median voter for highly progressive taxation. In addition to inequality,
the level of poverty in the respondent’s locality is also significantly related to preferences over the
tax system. In poorer municipalities levels of agreement with progressive taxation are higher, in
particular among the two lowest income groups.
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Figure 16. Agree with Highly Progressive Taxation.
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Note: Dots, jittered for graphical clarity, represent actual answers. Lines represent
fitted model for each profile of respondents and letting municipal inequality levels vary.
For the poor profile education was set to primary or less, for the low middle it was set to
secondary and the rich were coded as having college education. All other variables were
set to their medians. Church attendance was set to 2, religion to catholic, mobility to 2,
age to 36 years old, city size to big city, and percentage of poor to 27%.
Conclusion
Inequality has been a growing concern, specially in the Latin American region whose countries
rank among the least equal in the world. Policies that can ameliorate the situation have been the
focus of much attention, in particular by development institutions. Prominent among these policies
are those dealing with taxation and social spending, mainly transfers to the poor, social protection
schemes and education, which were all found to significantly affect the distribution of income.
Variation in the degree of implementation of these policies, however, is great. Why are
some policies politically viable in some cases, but not in others? To begin answering this question
we sought to identify the constituencies and levels of support for a variety of policies deemed
redistributive. The main input to democratic political processes is citizens’ preferences. Whether
politicians are motivated by votes10, campaign contributions or their own personal convictions,
10 One concern raised in the literature is that poorer respondents might be less likely to vote and thus impact policy
decisions less. In Brazil, based on data from the Electoral Tribunal, this is not the case. In other countries this might
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they base their decisions on some preference and must please some constituency. The bigger the
constituency for a policy and the higher the levels of support for it, the higher the chances of that
policy being advocated for and implemented.
While many theories have been developed to explain support for redistributive policies,
their empirical assessment have usually been carried out in isolation, in many cases relying on
a vague definition of redistribution, and usually having countries as the unit of analysis. In this
paper we focus on one country for comparability of measures, we combine both individual and
contextual factors identified in the literature as important in explaining predispositions towards
redistributive schemes, and we consider specific policies as opposed to “government redistributive
effort” vaguely defined. Redistributive policies come in different shapes and sizes, and there is no
reason to expect them all to garner the undivided support of the poor and the opposition of the rich.
Indeed, that’s what results suggest. Disagreement across socio-economic groups arise not
so much on whether the government should tackle inequality, but on how it should do it. This is
true both in terms of how to collect funds and how to go about spending it. Regarding patterns of
support, poorer respondents display a lot more variation across different policies than their richer
counterparts, whose willingness to pay higher taxes to finance these policies is usually low. As
expected in models of lump sum transfers, the poor display higher levels of support for cash-
transfer schemes (be them pensions to the old or conditional cash transfers to all ages) than richer
respondents. However, the reverse is true in the case of public provision of education. In that case,
richer respondents display higher levels of support, even if they are not the primary beneficiaries
of this policy. Inequality, in turn, seems to matter when the policy in question is conditional-
cash-transfer or how progressive the tax system should be. Contrary to expectations, however, as
inequality rises so does the support of the rich for conditional-cash-transfer. Thus inequality seems
to breed altruism when it comes to the quintessential poverty reduction scheme of helping the poor
conditional on certain behavioral requirements.
These patterns of support seem to account well for the discrepancies we observe between
cash transfers conditional on school attendance and the quality of education. While there is a
strong constituency for CCTs, which translates into hefty electoral gains, there is practically none
for education. CCTs, however, require that children of eligible families attend school, leading to
high rates of enrollment, and in many cases overcrowding of facilities and a heavier burden on
teachers. A concomitant policy for increasing the quality of education could help make the most
of this increases in enrollment prompted by CCTs. However, a constituency for such initiative
that is comparable in strength to that of CCT is lacking. Thus electoral incentives for politicians
to advocate for such complex policies are rather small and so are the incentives of users to hold
be true. The main objective in this study, however, is to identify preferences so that further work can be built on sound
assumptions about them. It is outside the scope of this project to investigate the next stages of the political process.
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politicians accountable in that area. This means that in order to promote such policies these in-
centives need to come from other sources and more oversight is necessary to achieved the desired
objectives.
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